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Any system that can be used by more than a single user must have some form of au-
thentication, authorisation and accounting (AAA) taking place. Some part of AAA can
happen outside of a computer system, for example having a guard standing in front of
the room housing computers that are not connected to external networks. When users
have different roles and privileges, a more sophisticated AAA setup needs to be in place
and the guard might have a list of people and what they are allowed to do. With connec-
ted systems that can be accessed from anywhere on the planet, validating users, their
permissions and logging their actions automatically is vital for any system or software
in order to function properly.
As the amount of software used in the world constantly grows, so does the amount of
flaws and security vulnerabilities available for attackers. With European Union's Gener-
al Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and similar legal frameworks around the world,
organisations are looking into securing their systems with emerging priority. The AAA
is a key part of these endeavours: while we want to provide users their data, we are also
trying to prevent unauthorised access by anyone else. With the number of system integ-
rations rising constantly, more often another system ends up using the service instead of
the end user. As systems use each others' data, it is also critical to know where the cop-
ies of the data end up and to what ends the data will be used in the future. In this regard
privacy of users' own data is also a growing concern.
As systems grow more complex, data itself is often stored separately from the user ac-
counts. To complicate this, decisions on who is allowed to read and modify the data de-
pend on their identity. Modern AAA provides the solutions for both tying the user back
to her data, as well as giving service the tools to verify that the user is also the one she
claims to be. Another current development is the increasing complexity of system archi-
tectures in the Internet of Things (IoT), where a sensor or probe might not only produce
data, but can also use data gathered by others to enhance its own functionality. As com-
plexity and amount of data grows, so do demands of load that systems are expected to
handle. Either authentication or authorisation cannot become a bottleneck that restricts
development.
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In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we discover current and time-tested technologies in securing and
verifying data and communications between systems, with focus on access control, the
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and communication
frameworks for distributed systems. In Chapter 6 we are looking into frameworks and
technologies that have been traditionally used to enable AAA for distributed systems.
Chapter 7 consists of communication models between separated system components and
systems with focus on the synchronous and asynchronous communication, as well as the
publish/subscribe communication model. 
In Chapter 8 we are presenting an example of how new technologies can be put togeth-
er, with an authentication service implementation for an open source Ambassador API
gateway [Amb17]. The service offers authentication by acting as OpenID Connect au-
thentication protocol client, storing authentication details in cryptographically signed
claim-representations, JSON Web Tokens (JWT). These JWTs can also be validated
without earlier knowledge of them on each incoming request, as they carry the proof of
authentication with them and they can be validated from their signature. The service can
also revoke signed tokens and operate both by itself or scale in parallel, supporting any
number of users without too much effort.
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2. Authentication, Authorisation & Accounting
In this chapter we cover the basics of authentication, authorisation and accounting
(AAA). The emphasis will be on definitions of AAA concepts, as well as the most com-
mon access control models currently in use and examples of their usage. 
Authentication involves validating that the user is who she claims to be [MET99]. Au-
thentication is often done with username and password, or by transferring the identity
from another service that has authenticated the user. Other methods involve using certi-
ficates and secondary tokens, but these are usually used together with passwords. We
will cover cryptography-based authentication and especially certificates more thor-
oughly in section 3.
Once identity has been confirmed, each action the user takes must be validated to be
within their assigned privileges. Authorisation covers the validation of actions accord-
ing to system-specific conditions. Principles for secure authorisation design were
presented in 1975 by Saltzer and Schroeder [SaS75]. Despite their work coming from an
age where the Internet or distributed systems did not exist, it is still surprisingly current
in its design suggestions. One example of these suggestions is the Complete Mediation
principle, which states that every access to every object within the system must be
checked for authority each time it is accessed. This guarantees that changes to user priv-
ileges are in effect immediately, not only after the user logs in next time. Other good
basis for secure systems is the Least Privilege principle, meaning that all users, roles or
groups should always start without any rights and only ones needed to complete the task
should be given.
After user has been correctly identified and each action authorised, actions taken must
also be logged and this is where accounting comes in. Accounting covers collecting the
information of user actions, which can then be used for logging, billing and possible se-
curity alerts if user is doing something that normally should not be done, even with the
correct privileges. In secure systems, logs should also be sent to a separate location so
accounting is preserved even in the event of a hacking incident or a catastrophic failure
where the system is wiped out. Accounting is not covered too broadly in this thesis, al-
though it is a key part of any secure system. The reason for this is the fact that account-
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ing itself is useless without authentication and authorisation, but it can be fitted into any
of the models that we cover. A little bit more about accounting can be found in Chapter
6, where we look into the simplicity of accounting with different authentication and au-
thorisation technologies.
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3. Access Control Models
Access control is the enforcement of rights after the user has been authorised and au-
thenticated: to whom the access to a resource is given and who should not be allowed.
Access control models differ based on whether we want to target individual users, user
groups or perhaps both. Starting from simple mandatory access control, models have
evolved as use cases have grown more complex [KHD10]. Currently numerous models
exist for different scenarios, but most of them can be categorised into four different
classes that we cover more deeply in the following subchapters. To simplify differences
and present different use cases, we're using an example of hospital IT with all the mod-
els.
3.1. Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory access control (MAC) gives control to an administrator of the resources.
The creator of a file or the end user, to whom access is given, cannot delegate access
further. Its history in the US military data protection, MAC has strict organisational
hierarchy and two different security models known as Biba and Bell-LaPadula [Lin06].
Biba is a more open model, where users at lower clearance levels can read what users at
higher levels have written, but cannot themselves modify this information. Bell-LaPad-
ula on the other hand, is the more standard access model where users at higher clearance
levels can read and modify anything others have written at lower levels, but cannot read
(or modify) anything created in clearance levels higher than their own. Bell-LaPadula is
the access control model most often used when handling critical information. 
The MAC can be used to create simple rules that can easily cover every use case within
the organisation, but it can also freeze organisational structures, as changes to a more
non-hierarchical structure are not supported by the used access control model.
In our example, a hospital using MAC might be using Bell-LaPadula, as performance
reviews of personnel, done by their superiors, should not be readable by their cowork-
ers. This allows more senior physicians on a higher authorisation level to read and
modify drug prescriptions and medical reports created by doctors with lower seniority,
but would not allow nurses to view them while attending to a patient. If we do not need
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patients to have access to the system, the Biba model, where younger doctors and nurses
can see the info for all patients, but cannot modify them without action from the attend-
ing physician, might be a more suitable candidate as the access control model. Account-
ing is also critical in protection of patient records and each access or modification
should be recorded and later validated to prevent confidential knowledge from spread-
ing. 
3.2. Role-Based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) does not concern itself with organisational structure
nor individual users, but the roles they possess [SCF96]. For example, user with the role
"employee" might see only her own information, whereas user with the role "HR" can
see other people's information as well, but cannot delete anything as this is reserved
only for the user with the "administrator" role. In RBAC, access can also be given to a
combination of roles so only HR people within a specific department might be able to
access the personal information of people within their department, but not personal in-
formation from other department's personnel. Similarly to MAC, in RBAC users often
cannot delegate access rights outside their own groups and rights are often given based
on automated policies.
With increased complexity, role delegation also requires more planning and auditing
from time to time, with the time period depending on the confidentiality of the protected
information. To reduce complexity, RBAC also includes sub model categories that limit
allocated roles based on the login session [SCF96]. With the Core RBAC (or Flat
RBAC) model, user is allowed only one role per session to prevent complex role man-
agement. The Hierarchical RBAC model is similar to Core RBAC in the sense that the
user will be equipped with the highest role in the role hierarchy according to her own
roles. As access management in hierarchical RBAC is based on roles and subroles, with
user being given the highest role that she has, without all the underlying roles. Between
single-role models and unlimited roles, there's also the Constrained RBAC model that
limits the number of roles based on organisational policy.
The RBAC for our example hospital might be based on hierarchical RBAC model, so
personnel can have access to patient information within their own department, but not to
patients in other departments of the same hospital. RBAC also allows for patients to ac-
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cess the system as the patient role allows seeing their own medical records.
3.3. Discretionary Access Control
Known especially from the standard access control models of Unix and Linux, Discre-
tionary Access Control (DAC) is the most flexible of the four models. In file systems,
DAC allows the owner of a file or folder to completely control access to her resources
and even to change user and group ownership of the file to someone else [OSM00].
DAC also prevents unauthorised users from seeing object details, such as file size or
modification dates.
Flexibility makes DAC a compelling option as the administration does not have to deal
with user requests for access rights to information, but it also comes with a cost of se-
curity concerns. With DAC, any user can give out access to protected resources on pur-
pose or by accident, which both can be leveraged by malware or badly written software
running with user's access rights [OSM00]. 
As DAC can be quickly implemented, our hospital might initially use it with their
shared filesystems. With this, an accountant for the hospital might have write access to
all the bills her department sends, but have only read access to bills from other depart-
ments. When the accountant accidentally opens a new bill for the department that con-
tains ransomware, it would encrypt only the parts of the shared drive that can be written
into, leaving the fate of department bills to depend on how well their backup policy is
working. Bills from other departments would be safe as the accountant does not have
write access to them.
3.4. Attribute-Based Access Control
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) is based on the idea of combined roles in
RBAC, but taken much further. The ABAC policies can include numerous rules with
simple Boolean Logic (if, else). For example, a policy can be used to check if the user is
over 18 years old and if she has completed necessary safety courses and has a driver's li-
cense in order to rent a car [YuT05]. Other simple use case for ABAC are university
courses where student has to have necessary knowledge before participating to a higher-
level course.
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Common downside of ABAC is the added complexity that can lead to someone gaining
access to wrong resources. Prevention of these cases requires sane defaults, well-
thought out rules and continuous auditing.
ABAC policies in the example hospital environment could be related to individual per-
formed operations. For example, a surgeon might have read and write access to a sur-
gery report for an operation that she is performing, but only read access to a one that is
done by one of her colleagues. After the surgery has been completed and report written,
write access might be revoked to maintain auditable records of past events.
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4. Secure Communication over Networks
For almost any single network request over the Internet, tens or hundreds of switches,
routers and servers are involved. Traffic can be listened in, captured or modified at any
point of its journey by malicious actors. Because of this, cryptography is required to en-
sure both confidentiality and integrity of digital communication between remote parties.
Public-key cryptography is a system that uses pairs of keys, public and private, to en-
crypt communication between parties. Public-key cryptography, also known as asym-
metric cryptography, was invented in two places [Ell99]. In 1970 a British government-
al cryptographer James H. Ellis presented his work in an internal document. Without
knowledge of Ellis' work, that was then a British government secret, two US crypto-
graphers, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman invented a similar solution and pub-
lished it in 1976. Diffie and Hellman presented the key exchange algorithm named after
them as Diffie-Hellman key exchange that later became a starting point for most of se-
cure communication happening over the Internet. Ellis never received recognition for
his work as it was made public only after his death in 1997.
4.1. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
With key exchange algorithms, two parties can set up a secure way of communicating
without knowledge of each others' private keys, and without anyone else being able to
observe the conversation by listening even when the whole traffic session has been
copied.
In the Internet, one of the most common use cases for public-key cryptography is the
key exchange in Transport Layer Security (TLS). The TLS is a protocol enabling en-
crypted Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTPS) traffic using a key-exchange algorithm
known as Diffie-Hellman key exchange [DVW92]. TLS, that also has support for other
key-exchange protocols, is in focus at Chapter 4.3. Diffie-Hellman (DH) is an imple-
mentation of modular arithmetics, where an interceptable modulus and base are used to-
gether with secret integers that each party keeps only to themselves. With secret in-
tegers, parties can set up a shared secret that is not feasible to calculate for anyone
listening in. This exchange is covered in Figure 1.
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As both sides discard their secret integers after the session has ended, it is not possible
for a listener to decrypt the conversation afterwards. It is however possible to execute a
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, with attacker performing Diffie-Hellman key ex-
changes with both parties, making them think that they are communicating only with
each other. To prevent this, public key certificates are used to verify identity of the serv-
er, and in some cases to verify identity of the client as well.
The DH key exchange shown in Figure 1 is a simplified one and is presented in this
form as a toy example. Modern DH has considerably bigger values as secrets and prime
p. Currently recommended primes and secrets are 2048 bits in length [GiB17], making
possible combinations close to impossible to calculate for an eavesdropping attacker. In
addition elliptic curves are often used in place of modular arithmetics in a key-exchange
protocol known as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [Tur14].
4.2. Public Key Infrastructure
Methods and physical means for signing, distributing, using, storing, distributing and re-
voking certificates are collectively known as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and the
Figure 1: Diffie-Hellman key exchange (simplified)
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standard format for certificates is known as X.509 [RFC5280]. The PKI defines how
trust to a specific certificate is allocated and how it propagates. Public key certificates
are proofs of key ownership, issued by an external trusted party known as a Certificate
Authority (CA) and validated by a Registration Authority (RA). PKI's use in certificate
acquisition is presented in Figure 2.
In a typical client-server context, server has a self-created private key that is kept secret
and never transmitted towards a client. In HTTPS, certificate subject is a certain host-
name, with a signed certificate proving that the private key belongs to the verified party.
The process involves a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) that includes owner informa-
tion such as company name, country and city, as well as Common Name (CN) and Sub-
ject Alternative Names (SAN) that are the domain names that require a certificate. Certi-
ficate authority processes the CSR and checks that the requesting party actually controls
the domain names that the certificate is requested for. The checks vary based on the
level of validation required for the certificate, but often a DNS record or file under a
specific path of the domain is required to grant a certificate for that domain. 
Validation process varies depending on the type of certificate [RFC3647]. With domain
validation, only the control of the domain(s) mentioned in CSR is checked through a
HTTP request, email or a new DNS record and is the most common certificate valida-
Figure 2: Public Key Infrastructure for SSL certificates
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tion type as it can be easily automated. Organisation validation involves confirming the
certificate with a person that is listed as a contact for the organisation in an official com-
pany register, in addition to domain validation. Extended validation covers both of these
and also requires a written intent by an official representative of a organisation request-
ing the certificate, as well as verification call from the RA to the representative to con-
firm the request.
Once the RA has finished validation, it will give a permission for the CA to issue a cer-
tificate for the requested domain names. The certificate has a property that as it was cre-
ated based on the specific CSR, it can also be used only with the private key used to cre-
ate the CSR. As browsers include the CA's root certificates, a new certificate is trusted
without updates for the browser. Certificates have a validity period covering from a few
months to even 3 years, preventing stolen certificates to be used indefinitely. If any
compromise is detected, certificates can be revoked faster in two different ways. The
original method was by using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) that is maintained
and signed by the CA. The CRL is updated regularly by the browser and then used loc-
ally, so no external request is required for each check. CRLs are considered problematic
as they do not provide an instantaneous way to revoke a compromised certificate. Be-
cause of this an alternative method, known as the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) is also used [RFC6960]. The CAs operate OCSP endpoints that have know-
ledge of every signed certificate, allowing users to check certificate validity in real time.
4.3. Transport Layer Security
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a collection of cryptographic protocols that enable
secure communication over the Internet [Tur14]. Besides Diffie-Hellman, TLS also sup-
ports other key exchange algorithms and aims to be a standard for all secure communic-
ation over networks, fitting to almost every communication use case involving TCP.
TLS was originally developed in 1999 to replace the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) de
facto standard that had been in use previously. Currently, an earlier SSL version 3.0 and
first TLS version 1.0 implementation are considered insecure and their use is discour-
aged. TLS versions currently supported are 1.1, 1.2 and the new version 1.3, which was
accepted as a standard in August 2018 [RFC8446].
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As illustrated in Figure 3, when a client contacts the server with a list of cipher suites
and TLS versions supported, the server selects the best ones it supports and replies with
them accompanied by its public certificate and its public key. After verifying certificate
validity (signed by a known CA, has not been expired, not in revocation list and
checked with OCSP) to prevent MITM attacks, the client encrypts the response using
the server's public key, so it is decryptable only with the server's private key. Client-
generated Pre-shared key (PSK) is also included. Pre-shared key is used to set up the
shared secret used in the actual TLS session. Shared secret is agreed by using some
form of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. As both parties delete the unique shared
secret after the session is over, the TLS sessions are not decryptable even if servers'
private key is exposed later. The undecryptability of older sessions is known as forward
secrecy.
Besides key exchange, TLS is also protecting the established connection. During key
exchange, parties also agree on the used cipher that will be symmetrically encrypted us-
ing the established shared secret. In addition, TLS also protects connection reliability as
it checks each incoming message with message authentication code, preventing the tam-
pering of encrypted data [RFC8446].
Figure 3: The TLS 1.2 three-way handshake. Diffie-Hellman 
randomised strings shown in Figure 2 are sent as part of 
ClientHello and ServerHello.
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The older stable version, TLS 1.2 was published in 2008 and had served for exactly 10
years when it was superseded by TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], that brings in new supported
ciphers and obsoletes older ones. Perhaps the biggest change from the old standard is
the shorter handshake, shown in Figure 4: instead of the standard three-way handshake
shown in Figure 3, TLS 1.3 uses a two-way handshake to establish the connection, sav-
ing time every time user connects to a new server endpoint. TLS 1.3 can can also re-
sume previous TLS sessions with an earlier shared key (Session Ticket), allowing the
client to send encrypted data along the first TCP packet. This feature is known as Zero
Round Trip (0-RTT).
TLS forms the backbone of secure communication between networked hosts. In Chapter
5.1, we continue with the same TLS 1.3 standard to see how it can also be used to verify
connecting clients or any two parties wanting to share data securely.
Figure 4: TLS 1.3 handshake & 0-RTT resumption later
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5. Distributed Systems and Microservices
As the term suggests, distributed systems consist of physically distributed components
that communicate with each other over a network. An example of such setup can be
seen in Figure 5. The scope of distributed systems varies, with some having all of their
components within a single datacenter, while others can have a global presence with
data stored and transferred between endpoints all around the world.
Even though application with its data residing on a separate server can also be defined
as a distributed system, we are focusing more on systems that have their data stored in
different locations. For example, user accounts and passwords can be stored in a separ-
ate location or service from the one used for the application. The application can then
call for the authentication service to verify user credentials.
Figure 5: An example of microservice platform with user accounts 
stored in another service
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The paradigm of disappearing master authority of data is clearly visible in the fields of
Internet of Things (IoT) and data processing. Traditionally, sensors have been the ones
publishing data and other systems have subscribed to their data feeds. This has lead to a
clear structure and direction for the system, even with many systems subscribing to the
same data [EFG03]. A newer, emerging paradigm that is shown in Figure 6 can have
sensors subscribing to each others' data and doing their own collecting based on that
data. The model, named as Connected Intranets of Things [RZL13], requires new types
of authentication and authorisation schemes as a single compromised sensor or probe
could otherwise be used to tamper and steal huge amounts of data. For example, if the
bed presented in Figure 6 could tell toilet to flush, it might do so repeatedly, wasting
huge amounts of water.
5.1. Overlays and Service Meshes
In a constantly changing environment the idea of servers having a dedicated IP address
or hostname is evaporating fast, as any service can exist only when it's needed or have
10 replicas of it to handle the incoming load. As virtualised or containerised applica-
tions can be started on any host, networking has evolved to find the correct destination
for requests. As shown in Figure 7, overlay network operates through virtual network
interfaces within compute nodes, and passes its packets encapsulated through a standard
physical network.
Figure 6: The movement of data within the IoT and Connected Intranets of Things 
paradigms
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Overlay networks can have the knowledge of each service endpoints location and can
forward traffic accordingly [AKB01], allowing services to talk with each other inde-
pendently of their physical location. With the addition of security features such as re-
quest auditing and firewalling, the concept of overlay networks has evolved into service
meshes that handle all communication between different distributed services. In Chapter
5.2.2, we are taking a closer look at Secure Production Identity Framework for Every-
one (SPIFFE) for network request authorisation and auditing and observe a real world
example of SPIFFE's usage in Chapter 8.
5.2. Secure Communication Mechanisms Between Services
The basis for secure networking has long been that private networks are secure and
communication within them is safe from prying eyes. With constantly changing distrib-
uted systems and changing attack vectors, this approach has become a liability and new
approaches are needed to secure the data [GiB17]. 
Often the first step in securing internal networks is the same we have been using for
communication over the Internet: TLS X.509 certificates. While this works fine on a
standard system where front end services query back end services, and they in turn
query databases, it may become problematic when services are subscribing and publish-
ing data to each other, similar to the Connected Intranets of Things model. Publish-sub-
Figure 7: Overlay network flows through the standard 
physical network
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scribe, explained in more detail in Chapter 7.2, requires both the sending and receiving
end to be sure about the other's identity. Below we are describing two ways to deal with
client authentication: mutual TLS using client certificates and a modern SPIFFE frame-
work using X.509 certificates in requests for authentication.
5.2.1. Mutual TLS
The TLS specification includes support for client certificates, allowing the server to ask
for the client to verify itself through some trusted CA that the server knows and trusts.
This allows an external party to verify clients and removes the need for password au-
thentication, trading password management for certificate management. 
Client certificates are requested during the initial handshake by the server, when it adds
CertificateRequest to its first response [RFC8443], as shown in Figure 8. This adds a
step to the handshake as the client needs to send its certificate to the server, thus making
handshakes in TLS 1.3 a three-way and in TLS 1.2 a four-way one. 
In untrusted networks, mutual TLS is a good choice for preventing brute-force and deni-
al of service attacks, as the attacker is not able to send any data without a valid certific-
ate. The disadvantage of using client certificates is the added overhead of certificate
management and renewal, although with the correct software this can be automated.
Figure 8: Mutual TLS handshake in TLS 1.3
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5.2.2. Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone
Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE) is an open standard initi-
ated by Google for service identities in a fastly changing distributed environments
[SPI17]. It is comprised of three components: a specification for naming identities
(SPIFFE ID), SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document (SVID) for authenticating the ser-
vice in requests, and the Workload API specification to generate SVIDs for services,
making it possible to create, renew, revoke and verify SVID certificates. Workload API
functionality is for validating identity for a single service, and it is shown in Figure 9
along with other SPIFFE components. 
SPIFFE IDs are Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) including the protocol (spiffe://),
trust domain (for example, prod.company.com) and a path that either identifies the ser-
vice (for example, /bi l l ing/backend), service owners (for example ,
/group/accounting/user/bill) or is just a unique identifier for it (for example /543ca66a-
3215-4f4b-a835-1771fe64279d). The trust domain does not need to be the actual ad-
dress of the platform, but it should remain the same for every service, with only the path
changing depending on the service.
The SVID is a certificate conforming to the X.509 standard [RFC6960], giving it the
same cryptographical properties as standard HTTPS certificates and making it possible
to verify SVIDs outside of SPIFFE. SVID is used with requests, making it possible for
the accessed service to verify the requesting party's identity and also to log it, making
auditing on a request-level a possibility.
Figure 9: SPIFFE communication between a web front end and an internal API
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6. Distributed Authentication, Authorisation & 
Accounting
Distributed Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) is not a new theme,
with research and implementations existing from the beginning of 1990's. These imple-
mentations usually include a single point of failure in the authentication step, although
authorisation can in some cases be done in a distributed manner.
Figure 10 illustrates technologies presented in this chapter and their relation to authen-
tication, authorisation and accounting. The noticeable lack of accounting technologies is
due to the fact that accounting by itself does not do anything, and it is always related to
authentication or authorisation, or even both. Different technologies are organised in a
way that shows how simply accounting can be tied to their usage. Each one of the
presented technologies can be made to support accounting, but technologies such as
Kerberos are built in a way that makes accounting easier to provide.
As illustrated in Figure 11 below, authentication and authorisation in distributed sys-
tems can be done in four different ways. Each one of them includes different possibilit-
Figure 10: Technologies and their relation to AAA
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ies on how authentication and authorisation can be arranged in distributed systems, and
each one has its own benefits and drawbacks.
The first example is the traditional one of each service doing their own authentication
and authorisation. When a monolithic application is broken down to smaller services
without re-thinking the AAA infrastructure, the same credentials database can be used
by all services. But as services grow and start requiring their own databases, services
start to maintain their own credentials along with object permissions for user authorisa-
tion. While this is an understandable situation when a service is growing and evolving,
it will eventually become too difficult to maintain and other models are needed.
Moving from local AAA to a more distributed direction, a second option is to do both
authentication and authorisation centrally, with services only abiding by the given per-
missions. In the case of user-specific access controls, this model might make it hard to
maintain more fine-grained object permissions, but with role or attribute based access
control (RBAC, ABAC) introduced in Chapter 2 it offers a single point for permission
management and policies.
Figure 11: Possibilities for distributed or centralised 
authentication (authn) and authorisation (auths)
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A compromise between the two models of everything local or everything centralised, is
to do authentication centrally and keep object permissions within each service. This en-
ables support for more fine-grained user-specific object permissions, but makes central-
ised permission policies harder to implement. Even though RBAC or ABAC cannot be
centrally implemented with this model, it might seem tempting as adding new permis-
sions to a single service can be more easily done.
The fourth model is to have centralised authorisation and localised authentication, with
each service validating the user on its own, but fetching access rights from a centralised
location. This model is arguably the worst of the four, and is only mentioned because of
completeness. As authentication is done locally, each service would need to keep track
of local user database, but also maintain a relationship with a centralised rights database.
This would lead to a lot of duplicate code and would allow new attack vectors if any of
the authentication implementations were to be faulty.
Judging from a legal standpoint, the second approach might seem the most feasible, as
AAA is done centrally and user access to each service endpoint is validated before the
request is allowed to the specific service. While bugs and misconfigurations in the cent-
ral AAA service could be fatal, this reduces the attack surface as other services are more
protected from harm.
With either centralised authentication or authorisation, system needs a separate gateway
to vet requests before passing them onwards so the service can be certain that provided
details of the user or her rights are not fabricated. This can also be achieved with crypto-
graphic checks, as is done with JSON Web Tokens presented in Chapter 6.2.1, but a
gateway to check incoming requests can provide value with accounting and other tasks
in these cases as well. The related API gateway model is presented more thoroughly in
Chapter 8.
6.1. Traditional Mechanisms of Distributed AAA
As we have mentioned before, AAA is not a new theme in distributed environments.
Earliest technologies were originally created in 1980s, and even though they have seen
development their architecture has not changed much. We are presenting a few that are
still in use today and provide time-tested AAA to the systems they are guarding.
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6.1.1. Simple Authentication Security Layer
T h e Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) was originally created by John
Gardiner Myers of Carnegie Mellon University in 1997 as RFC 2222, and updated in
2006 [RFC4422]. SASL allows a whole variety of services to be used as authentication
endpoints with the same protocol, effectively decoupling authentication from applica-
tion protocols with the provided abstraction. This enables server software to use many
different authentication backends without implementing each of them separately, just by
supporting SASL authentication.
SASL authentication can be established by a trusted service that processes user creden-
tials and replies with results. One example of a common use case for SASL is a distrib-
uted email system, presented in Figure 12. Within the system, each component needs to
verify user credentials when processing mailbox logins with Internet Message Access
Protocol (IMAP) or sending email with Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). With
this setup, all email servers can share an authentication backend where login credentials
are queried with SASL before user is allowed to access resources.
6.1.2. Kerberos
Kerberos is one of the earliest authentication protocols that is still widely used in many
distributed systems and computer organisations. Originally developed within Massachu-
Figure 12: IMAP and SMTP with SASL back end login
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setts Institute of Technology, its first non-internal version 4 was published in the late
1980s, and version 5 eventually became a standard as RFC 1510 in 1994 [KNT94]. The
standard was made obsolete in 2005 with the renewed RFC 4120, but it still maintains
backwards compatibility for the older Kerberos version 5.
Kerberos operates on tickets to allow nodes to prove their identity without trusting each
other with the help of a trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC), shown in Figure 13.
Other Kerberos-authentication-related objects are the Authentication Server (AS) and
the Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) that are both often found from the same KDC. Ker-
beros client transmits the user's id to the AS, that sends back a session key encrypted
with the users password or public key, along with an encrypted Ticket Granting Ticket
(TGT) to be used in the next step. If client has the correct password or key for the user,
it is able to decrypt the Client/TGS Session Key and use that to decrypt the TGT from
the message.
After validating the user, client sends a request to TGS with the ID of the service it
wants to authenticate with, along with TGT. After decrypting the TGT with previously
agreed Client/TGS Session Key, TGS sends back encrypted Client-to-Server Ticket in-
cluding client information and a newly created Client/Server Session Key that client
needs to use to communicate with the service. With the Client/Server Session Key and
Client-to-server ticket (that was encrypted using the service's secret key), service is able
Figure 13: Kerberos authentication to a single service. As long 
as the TGT remains valid, only steps 3-6 need to be done for 
other services.
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to ascertain identity of the user that client is representing and can provide service to the
client. On the other side, connecting client can also be sure of the server's identity. As
long as TGT has not expired, it can be reused to get Client-to-Server Tickets for other
services as well.
Because Kerberos has a trust model based on symmetric key cryptography, it has been
able to withstand the test of time with updates to the cryptographic algorithms from
DES, which was originally used, to for example AES and other more secure algorithms.
Similar updates can keep Kerberos alive in the future as well. Another aspect that helps
keep Kerberos model current is the usability of the model in an automated manner. As
there is no Single Sign-On (SSO) endpoint for the user to interact with, systems can au-
thenticate and communicate between each other without a human operator with just
stored credentials. With Internet of Things and distributed systems, Kerberos will likely
retain its role as trust provider for numerous different services.
6.1.3. Security Assertion Markup Language
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is a standard and an XML-based markup
language for exchanging authentication and authorisation data between identity and ser-
vice providers [HEL05]. One notable SAML-based entity is the Shibboleth framework
that is used by numerous public service organisations and universities across the world.
Login functionality is shown in detail in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Login to a service through SAML single sign-on (SSO)
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The SAML authentication begins with the service provider redirecting the user's
browser to the identity provider (IdP), along with an assertion XML document defining
the requested action. SAML assertion contains the requested action, for example an Au-
thnRequest when authenticating users, as well as the information about the issuer and
RelayState to point to a resource, as is done in Figure 14. After authentication, IdP re-
directs the user back to the service with the SAML response XML document included in
the redirect. Response contains original ID that was sent from the service in a SAML as-
sertion, as well as other details that can be used when the response is verified from the
IdP. Other possibility for verification is to include a cryptographically signed token (for
example, a JSON Web Token as explained in section 5.2.1) in the response that can be
used to validate the response without contacting the IdP, but by just knowing its public
key. 
6.2. New distributed authentication & authorisation models
While the models presented in section 5.1 have existed for quite some time, distributed
systems themselves have evolved in many ways. Previously distribution happened
mostly with centralised account management, with accounts separately accessible from
the systems providing the service. Newer development has seen the rise of mi-
croservices, where a single system can consist of tens or even hundreds of small ser-
vices. Many of these can process user information and need to independently make de-
cisions whether to give out requested data or to deny the request. As such services can
operate in another datacenter or even in another continent, calling home and asking for
confirmation is not always an option. In this chapter we present technologies that are
well suited for distributed use cases found in modern applications.
6.2.1. JSON-based standards
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) published a set of JSON-based standards
in 2015, including JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and
JSON Web Token (JWT) [Jon11]. Together they present a group of standards usable
with the Javascript API, making it approachable for browsers and server software alike.
JSON Web Token is a prime candidate for distributed authentication, as it can be signed
28
by the authentication service and validated by other services with its public key. In the
new 5G standard, JWTs are currently specified to be used as OAuth 2.0 access tokens
[GPP18].
In addition to just a username, JWT can hold all kinds of information, including token
signing time, expiration time, user roles and all sorts of private claims that need to be
agreed on only by the token issuer and consumers [RFC7797]. Figure 15 illustrates JWT
structure that consists of three different parts: the header that includes a signing al-
gorithm and tokens type, the payload that includes the data and the signature that can be
used to validate JWT's integrity and its signee, with either a shared secret or by its pub-
lic key, depending on what algorithm has been used in token creation.
As a single mechanism for both authentication and authorisation, plain JWTs do not ne-
cessarily make for a secure mechanism, since authorisation might be passed with the
signed token, making it impossible to change privileges of an already-issued token. For
just authentication, with each service doing authorisation JWTs are easy to use and offer
a good solution for a secure authentication layer.
For centralised authorisation, it is also possible to use authorisation-included JWTs only
within the system, with an API gateway fetching a new token from the authorisation
service for each request. This model also adds an extra check before any request reaches
the service, making it harder for an attacker to take advantage of signed but yet revoked
tokens. Unfortunately, increased security also adds extra complexity to the system, mak-
ing the authorisation service a single point of failure even when the user has already
Figure 15: A JSON Web Token in encoded and 
decoded form.
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logged in. Because of this, the refresh token model presented in section 5.3 with OAuth
2.0 and OpenID Connect might be a better alternative. 
6.2.2. OAuth 2.0
OAuth is a standard for delegating access to application to use user information stored in
other service. A good use case for OAuth would be Gmail's contact list that is required
by Facebook to show which of your contacts are already using the service. Access to the
contact list is gained through service APIs. After authorisation, the application can use
specific parts of the service on users' behalf once or until the access is revoked.
OAuth standard was originally born in 2007, and published as informational RFC 5849
in 2010. First implementations were created by Twitter, with Google and others follow-
ing soon. However, the standard was not deemed adequate for non-browser-applications
and it was too complex for simple use. OAuth 2.0 framework, published as standard in
2012 [RFC6749], responds to these problems by simplifying many aspects of the origin-
al OAuth, a now obsolete RFC 5849.
OAuth 2.0 has different grant types for specific authorisation use cases, such as single-
page apps that cannot have application secrets, or even password-specific grant type for
authorisation services own applications. Most common usage is for a normal service
that can store application secrets in its own database and communicate with the author-
isation endpoint without visibility to the user. This grant type is known as Authorization
Code, that can also be used without secrets in single-page apps or mobile applications.
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Authorization Code Grant, shown in Figure 16, starts with the user being redirected
from service to the authorising service's auth endpoint with specified response type and
unique client id of the service or application. Also included are redirect URL informing
where the user should be returned when done, scope indicating the parts of user's in-
formation service wants to access and state, which is a random string that is expected to
be returned when the authorisation is done. Authorising service (after logging in, if no
session exists) then presents the user an authorisation prompt with scopes needed by the
service. After accepting the prompt, user is redirected back to the original service along
with the same state string that was passed to the service, and an auth code, a one-time
code that the service will use to get the access token in order to use the resources of the
authorising service. Depending on the flow, token exchange can include a client secret
that is known only to the service requesting the token, not to the user or browser. In
single-page or mobile apps, the secret can be left out, but this needs to be defined when
the application is initially registered with the authorisation service.
Implicit Grant is a simplified version of the Authorisation Code Grant that was previ-
ously recommended for single-page JavaScript applications and other software that do
not necessarily have a backing service running and keeping secrets from the front end
application itself. In Implicit Grant flow, access token is received from the authorisation
service without separate token exchange using the one-time key given in redirect. While
Figure 16: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Grant
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this was saving an additional HTTP request, it has problematic security implications
that can allow an attacker to steal the access token more easily. As the token is trans-
ferred as part of the redirect URL, browsers cache it into their history and it becomes
easier for the attacker to steal the token. Other problematic feature of the Implicit Grant
is the lack of 'state' variable found in Authorisation Code Grant that needs to be the
same throughout the authorisation flow, making brute force attacks harder. Because of
these, current recommendation for single-page applications and mobile applications is to
use the Authorisation Code Grant without application secret, where state is preserved
through the authorisation flow and no tokens are passed in redirect URLs.
Different tokens between client and server are also an issue. Newly upgraded Best Cur-
rent Practice for OAuth 2.0 suggests using the standard approach to access tokens by
separating them to a specific refresh token with even years of lifetime and to a more
short-lived access token, that is used to access the service. This approach is shown in
Figure 17 below. Refresh token is used by the application to get the access token from
the service's token endpoint, and then accessing the provided resources [RFC8252].
OAuth 2.0 has become de facto standard for API access delegation and is currently
widely used for this purpose. While OAuth 2.0 is an authorisation protocol, it has also
been used for authentication. This is done by authorizing the user with only user's in-
formation in authorisation scope, and then fetching the user identity from the authorisa-
tion provider. This is known as pseudo-authentication and OAuth 2.0 should not be mis-
Figure 17: Refresh & access token usage with 
authorisation server.
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taken to be an authentication protocol, as identity might not be as tightly coupled with
the API access to certain services given with OAuth 2.0 authorisation. For example, if
the checked scope is user information, this might also be available to an administrator of
the authorisation service and it could be used to gain access to another service. Other
possible attack routes have also been presented and fixed [SuB12].
OAuth 2.0 can also be combined with JSON Web Tokens. In a 2015 abstract extension,
JWTs for authorisation grants and client credentials were described in a standard
[RFC7523]. As client credentials can be described in JWT format, browser could au-
thenticate and authorise against an OAuth 2.0 endpoint without user needing to do any-
thing if the JWT is signed by a trusted party. When combined with the Web Authentica-
tion API currently developed as an experimental feature in browsers, future end users
could sign in and authorise services with their browser-stored JWTs without typing
passwords. JWTs as OAuth 2.0 tokens also help making the services more secure, as the
application can be sure of the token-issuers identity with its public key as tokens have
been signed. In the new 5G standard, currently in development, JWT's will be used as
access tokens with the Client Credentials Grant  [GPP18].
6.2.3. OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect (OIDC) [SBJ14] is an authentication layer built on top of the OAuth
2.0 specification. OIDC uses JSON Web Tokens (JWT) to represent identities and au-
thentication happens using similar authentication flows as OAuth 2.0 has: authorisation
code, implicit flow and hybrid flow. As OAuth 2.0 is already in wide-spread use, creat-
ing OIDC-compatible authentication flows is relatively easy as developers already have
some knowledge of OAuth 2.0. OIDCs Authorization Code Flow is similar to OAuth
2.0's one presented in Figure 16. Different OIDC flows and their properties are illus-
trated below in Figure 18.
Similarly to OAuth 2.0, OIDC also supports refresh tokens, but access tokens are known
as id tokens, since in OIDC specification access tokens are for authorisation decisions
made by resource servers. With both refresh and id tokens being signed JWTs, authen-
tication to separate service endpoints happens easily as each endpoint can independently
assess the validity of identity tokens representing the user. OIDC JWTs can also contain
information of users' roles, making role-based access control (RBAC) an easy approach
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even in distributed contexts.
Authorisation Code Flow is almost an exact copy of the OAuth 2.0 one. When authen-
ticating, user is given a one-time code that is passed back to the application (client),
which then uses the one-time code, along with its client secret to fetch id token to get
the logged in user's identity. Additionally, a refresh token is given to the application to
renew the shorter-lived id token when it expires. 
Implicit Flow is meant for applications that do not necessarily have a back end server to
communicate with, but need to authenticate in order to communicate with one or numer-
ous API endpoints. Similar to OAuth 2.0's implicit grant, no client secret is used and ID
token is stored within an application (desktop or mobile) or in the browser. Implicit
Flow is much lighter than Authorisation Code Flow, but carries security risks similar to
its OAuth 2.0 paragon that are described in the above chapter.
Hybrid flow is more rarely used, but it still exists as part of OIDC. In Hybrid flow, both
the front end and back end of the application can receive their own ID tokens, with front
end receiving it from the identity provider (IdP) when logging in, and back end by using
the passed one-time code and client secret similar to Authorisation Code flow. One use
case for this is when we want to pass roles and other information to the back end applic-
ation in the ID token that we do not want to be visible to the user. Other possibility for
this is to use encrypted JSON Web Token, but as it isn't covered in the OpenID Connect
specification, we do not explore this further.
6.2.4. Macaroons
Similar to JWTs, Macaroons constitute a proof-carrying authorisation scheme where an
access token can be modified and restricted further after issuance, include validation re-
Figure 18: OpenID Connect flow comparison [SBJ14], coloring added for the thesis.
Property Authorization Code Flow Implicit Flow Hybrid Flow
All tokens from authorization endpoint no yes no
All tokens from token endpoint yes no no
Tokens not revealed to user agent yes no no
Client can be authenticated yes no yes
Refresh token possible yes no yes
Communication in one round trip no yes no
Most communication server-to-server yes no varies
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quirements from 3rd party service and be passed along to other services using the issuing
service on behalf of the user [BPE14]. Macaroons include contextual caveats that can be
used to limit the given scope to what the token can be used for. This is similar to vallet
keys found in more expensive cars that allow them to be driven for a limited amount
and with reduced speed for parking the car, but cannot be used to fully drive the car
when compared to what can be done with an actual key.
As shown in Figure 19, Macaroon consists of a secret string known only by the creating
service, location indicating where the Macaroon should be used and an identifier that
can describe Macaroon's scope, for example "Billing service". Macaroons are based on
a hashing function, but can also be signed with private keys and validated with public
ones, similarly to client certificates. Most interesting properties of Macaroons are first
and third party caveats that can be layered on top of the original Macaroon. For ex-
ample, initial Macaroon is hashed with the secret variable known only by the issuer.
Each layer on top of the initial Macaroon, containing caveats such as username or valid-
ity, is hashed with itself, and issuer can easily verify each addition as well as the origin-
al token when the initialisation vector is known. With key signing, others can also valid-
ate the Macaroon if public keys are known.
Third party caveats specify that Macaroon cannot be trusted unless it is satisfactory for a
third party, for example, an identity service such as Google or Facebook. To satisfy the
requirement, user must log in to the service and have it sign the token. In a web browser
environment, this can be done automatically as user is often already signed in to the ser-
Figure 19: Example Macaroon for a billing service.
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vice within the same browser session.
Macaroons are not an authentication or authorisation framework such as OAuth 2.0 or
OpenID Connect, but can be used to harden them by substituting the created access
tokens with Macaroons [BPE14]. This allows an authorisation service to delegate au-
thentication to a third party service more easily, as is shown in Figure 20, and removes
the worry of revocation as identity endpoint can issue Macaroons for 10 seconds and al-
most every new request would require client to ask for a newly signed Macaroon. As
Macaroons default hashing is based on the HMAC function, this operation does not re-
quire much computing power and verification can thus be performed without much
computational overhead.
Figure 20: Macaroon usage with third party caveats.
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7. Communication Mechanisms Between Microservices
and Distributed Systems
As distributed systems and microservices perform most of their communication between
remote parts, efficiency of that communication is essential. Latency can easily become a
bottleneck if any call to a system generates more calls to other systems, with each sub
request adding up to a time it takes to resolve the original request. While HTTP-based
methods have not disappeared from intra-service communication landscape, they have
gotten company from a whole family of other communication standards and paradigms.
In this chapter, we attempt to present a variety of both synchronous and asynchronous
methods for achieving efficient and trusted communication between separated system
components.
When speaking of asynchronous and synchronous communication, it is important to un-
derstand that we are not discussing programming language semantics, where a language
allows an operation to be handled asynchronously while doing other tasks. With asyn-
chronous we mean, in this context, events that are not necessarily fully completed when
the remote request is finished, such as pushing a message to a queue, where messages
are picked up and processed later. Whether the later processing happens within a second
or within a few hours makes no difference.
7.1. Synchronous Mechanisms
Synchronous mechanisms offer an immediate response on the performed remote action.
Traditionally, all communication between systems and system components has
happened in a synchronous manner.
Many events in systems require synchronous processing. For example, a bank transfer
from an account to another requires that events on both accounts, withdrawal from one
and deposit to other, are completed. Otherwise money will either disappear or come into
existence from nothing. With synchronous communication, requesting party can be cer-
tain that the event was processed before proceeding. 
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7.1.1. Remote Procedure Calls
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) was the first widely accepted idea of remote communica-
tion between processes [TaV07]. First designed to allow programs to run on different
computers without sharing memory, it evolved into XML-RPC in 1998 for the purpose
of functioning on top of HTTP. More recent application of the RPC paradigm is JSON-
RPC, originally from 2005.
The RPC model, as well as its XML and JSON variants, consists of application calling
its own conversion stub that packages its request to a specified format and sends it to a
remote server for processing. Once remote server has performed the task, its stub passes
it back to the calling client's stub and execution continues. An example of this is shown
in Figure 21.
During the current decade, synchronous RPCs were mostly forgotten and thought to be
a dying breed that would eventually be replaced completely by RESTful APIs, but recent
development has proved otherwise. In 2015, Google published its internal RPC frame-
work known as Stubby, under a new name, gRPC Remote Procedure Call (gRPC) [GM-
D15] for both asynchronous and synchronous message passing. The gRPC framework
has since become part of the Cloud-Native Computing Foundation (CNCF) and is con-
sidered a key framework in internal communication of distributed systems. 
Figure 21: Example of RPC call over a network. Execution continues when 
steps 1, 2 and 3 are completed.
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gRPC as an implementation framework allows clients written in different languages to
communicate with each other using a Google-oriented way to serialize data structures
known as protocol buffers that are presented in Figure 22. In this regard, gRPC is simil-
ar to XML-RPC, but with smaller and more efficient packaging and native language
support, making its use more tempting.
7.1.2. HTTP-Based Methods
Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture was defined in 2000 as part of the
PhD dissertation by Roy Fielding [Fie00]. REST uses HTTP properties to define archi-
tectural constraints that require APIs to represent their functionality by using base
URLs , s uch a s ap i . company . com/ us e r s t o r ep re se n t u s e r s e rv i ce ,
api.company.com/billing to represent billing etc. Elements are represented under collec-
tions, for example api.company.com/users/user1 that covers a specific user. In addition,
APIs conforming to the RESTful specification require the use of standard HTTP meth-
ods to create, read, update and delete objects in collections. Possible actions for a single
item are shown in Figure 23.






Figure 22: gRPC protocol buffer describing a person and communication between 
people
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RESTful APIs have become a standard way of representing API resources to outside
users, but their usage is also increasing within distributed systems and especially within
microservices. As services can allow several different functions to other services within
the system, it is easy to represent them with RESTful semantics, making it easy for de-
veloper of another service to use the needed implementation available.
Recently, RESTful APIs have seen a contestant as GraphQL was published by Face-
book in 2015, with the latest working draft towards a GraphQL standard from October
2016 [Gra16]. GraphQL is a query language and type system that offers a developer-
friendly way to search for data provided by the API and to easily mock queries using the
provided web user interface to receive only the needed parts from the API, as is shown
in Figure 24. GraphQL does not provide similar semantics with URIs as RESTful APIs
do, but it offers same functionality through its own query language. Currently it is most
often used as a read-only API for data, but this might change in the future as its usage
grows and GraphQL implementations and its use cases become more tested and
hardened in terms of security. As internal usage does not have as strict security require-
ments as something that is open to the world, GraphQL can more easily become trusted
as an internal component within a system.
7.2. Asynchronous mechanisms
Asynchronous mechanisms offer systems a possibility to perform non-time-critical ac-
tions when resources allow. They also allow the system to scale more easily when more
Figure 24: REST queries are smaller, but GraphQL allows requesting specifically 
what is needed
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requests are coming in as events are not failing due to more stringent timeout expecta-
tions often found in synchronous communication. 
In message queue -based communication, described in 6.2.1. and 6.2.2., message sender
(publisher) will publish the message into a broker-maintained  message queue. Message
recipients (consumers) are meanwhile subscribed into the queue with the broker, and re-
ceive the message when it is published with the broker. Message queues support point-
to-point delivery where message is strictly from a single party to another, as well as the
publish/subscribe model where a single message queue can be shared with one or more
publishers and consumers [EFG03]. Consumers in publish/subscribe model are often
separated into listeners that only receive messages from a queue when they are connec-
ted to it, and into consumers that also receive the queued messages that the broker re-
ceived when they were not connected. The broker-centric model, also known as loose
coupling, allows system components to operate without the knowledge of each other
and their addresses, as all communication is done through a message broker system
[TaV07]. This is illustrated in Figure 25.
Publish/subscribe model has enabled a generation of new fault-tolerant microservice
systems, where parts of the system can be taken down for maintenance or replacement
without other parts being affected. The amount of data that is produced and consumed
has exploded in the recent years, and as the trend grows, data streams have become a
critical part of infrastructure. Progress in the development of event-based architecture is
leading to the rise of the streaming platform, where message brokers are at the heart of
each system [LZF17].
Figure 25: Publish-subscribe with broker. Topic produced by 
producer 4 currently has no consumers.
41
7.2.1. Advanced Message Queuing Protocol 
Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP) is a binary protocol that was the first
step in an effort to create standards in the field of proprietary messaging formats in or-
der to allow different systems to communicate with each other [Vin06]. Adopted as an
international standard in 2014 [ISO14], AMQP is a good option for communicating
between systems or organisations, as it is well defined and easily scalable. Especially
business systems have grown fond of it. AMQP message format is shown in Figure 26
and defines the bare message that includes the original data from publisher as an unal-
terable part of the message. Bare message includes optional list of standard properties,
as well as application-specific properties, including the message body itself.
AMQP is usable both with a message broker or between single system endpoints, and is
quite ambiguous as a protocol in order to support multiple different scenarios. Adoption
of the standardised 1.0 version has been relatively slow, but over time brokers support-
ing AMQP will either add support or migrate entirely to it, as it does not contain break-
ing changes to its pre-standardised versions.
7.2.2. Message Queue Telemetry Transport
Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) is another standardised messaging pro-
tocol, built specifically to handle working with the publish/subscribe -based messaging
architectures [ReD17]. Originally created by IBM, MQTT was submitted to OASIS
standardisation body and became a standard with version 3.1.1 in 2014 [OAS14]. The
MQTT protocol with its compact message sizes is a perfect candidate for small sensors
and other Internet of Things devices where resources and network bandwidth are often
scarce. When compared to AMQP, MQTT protocol is more suitable for pushing mes-
Figure 26: AMQP message format specification [ISO14].
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sages to a processing network, but MQTT has a clear scope of being a client-server pro-
tocol. Therefore, AMQP is better suited for point-to-point communication without ex-
ternal brokers.
The MQTT protocol consists of control packets, shown in Figure 27. Message type spe-
cifies the attempted operation, with 3 being a type for publishing a message. Other mes-
sage types include opening a connection, as well as acknowledging a received message.
MSB and LSB in Figure 27 stand for Most Significant Byte and Least Significant Byte.
In contrast to AMQP, the MQTT protocol does not scale so easily within single mes-
sage queues, but passing messages between entities close to each other and onwards to
processing platforms is a well supported use case. When we consider a modern data
analysis platform where endpoints are not just publishing data, but instead they are also
subscribers to different data streams, both MQTT and AMQP might be needed in order
for the platform to work efficiently.
7.2.3. Message Broker Specific Protocols
As the publish/subscribe model gains popularity, the number of different message
brokers available has also increased. Most brokers adhere to existing standards and of-
ten support either MQTT, AMQP or even both of them. Some message brokers have
defined their own protocols that have become relevant as the popularity of the broker
has grown. Two of these are Apache Foundation's Kafka and Pulsar.
Kafka was originally a software created within LinkedIn, and was open sourced in 2012.
Currently developed by the Apache Foundation, Kafka has grown to be the most used
Figure 27: MQTT control packet message format 
for type 3 (PUBLISH) messages [OAS14]
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message broker due to its almost endless scalability as it can handle almost a million
events with just a single consumer. Kafka has its own binary protocol that works over
TCP. Kafka's protocol supports messages of different sizes, arrays as well as strings.
Though proprietary, the protocol is well documented and has well-supported client lib-
raries available in almost every programming language. 
Newer contestant in the broker field is another Apache Foundation project, Pulsar. Cur-
rently in incubator stage, it originates from Yahoo and has seen years of production us-
age inside the company, and is rising quickly in usage. Pulsar has two different proto-
cols available: its own binary protocol using protocol buffers (Protobuf) and a separate
protocol using standard W3C websockets [RFC6455]. While Pulsar is a much younger
project than Kafka, its websocket protocol helps in adoption as the standard can be used
on any existing programming language with websocket support available. Some clients
already exist for Pulsar's own protocol as well, with many more in the roadmap, and
with growing adoption, Pulsar's Protobufs, presented in Chapter 7.1.1 in Figure 22,
might very well be the next big proprietary messaging protocol.
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8. Authentication, Session Management and Identity 
Propagation for Microservices
The API gateway is a great tool in controlling access to different microservices. Ambas-
sador [Amb17] is one such gateway that can be used to protect services running in the
Kubernetes container orchestration platform [Kub14]. Ambassador works together with
other components using SPIFFE, providing trusted communication environment for
Ambassador and other resources running in the platform. Besides acting as a load balan-
cer for back end services, Ambassador offers support for external authentication mod-
ules that can be used in incoming request validation. To demonstrate the power of scal-
able session management and support for user accounts stored elsewhere, we created, as
part of the thesis work, an external authentication service for Ambassador using OpenID
Connect and JSON Web Tokens. Code for the authentication service can be found from
its repository [Myy18], with functional code also included as attachment in Chapter 11.
The authentication service, named simply Ambassador-Auth-OIDC (AuthService)
checks requests for cookies that contain JWTs and if such cookie exists, also checks the
embedded JWT for validity. AuthService is written in the Go programming language
for fast operations and JWTs are signed using the HMAC-SHA-512 algorithm
[RFC7519], making it possible to validate them if the secret is known. AuthService also
supports login through OIDC with Authorisation Code Flow and logout functionality.
Figure 28: Request flow from an unauthenticated user through Ambassador, 
AuthService and OIDC provider
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Figure 28 represents an unauthenticated request towards a protected resource. As the
user is not logged in, OIDC Authorisation Code Flow is used to login the user and her
userinfo is stored into a signed JWT that is included in user's HTTP cookie. User is then
redirected back to the original resource and cookie stored in browser is attached to the
request. AuthService then validates the JWT within the cookie and gives Ambassador
permission to proceed with the request that is sent to the resource server.
AuthService uses an external key-value storage to store OIDC mid-login states and re-
voked JWTs, so any running instance can finish the authentication flow. The storage is
however not used on request validation and AuthService only syncs its revocation
blacklist with it each minute, fetching JWTs that other AuthService instances have re-
voked. Separating key-value storage from AuthService's operation allows more than one
AuthService to be in use at the same time and allows multiple API gateways with fast
stateless request validation to be geographically distributed. This design choice also
helps with the service scaling to thousands or even millions of simultaneous requests as
the key-value store would easily become a bottleneck. It also removes additional latency
as JWTs can be validated without network requests.
A common pitfall with JWTs is revocation. As JWTs themselves are stateless, often
suggested solution is to forget revocation by issuing tokens with short lifetime and
checking session status each time a token is renewed. This requires more work in the
browser-side and if device is sleeping in between, JWT has often expired and login
needs to be done again. AuthService mitigates this by using longer lifetimes for JWTs
and instead controls a revocation blacklist that contains blacklisted tokens until their
validity expires. Each request is checked against the local blacklist and the local black-
list is synchronised from the central key-value store once every minute, so revocations
done by other AuthService instances are synced to every instance. Reason for not stor-
ing the blacklist only in the key-value store and syncing it locally is the same as the
reason for using JWT's in the first place: local validation for all incoming requests
without additional latency caused by querying the key-value store.
Each AuthService endpoint can easily process almost a thousand requests each second.
As they can be horizontally scaled with additional copies, AuthService will not become
a bottleneck even with a high number of simultaneous users.
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9. Conclusions
Many technologies exist for implementing authentication, authorisation and accounting
for distributed systems and microservices. This thesis has presented several current and
also emerging technologies in this field and also given a concrete example of their use
for the Ambassador microservice API gateway. JSON Web Tokens and OpenID Con-
nect's Authorisation Code Flow were used in the authentication component to imple-
ment a stateless session handling and a secure way to authenticate users.
As systems, technologies and networks are evolving in ways that we often cannot pre-
dict, we need a versatile approach for AAA in order to securely support a wide variety
of different scenarios. Public-key cryptography is likely to be a key part of any future
AAA scheme, both in protecting communication as well as in message verification. The
use of JSON Web Tokens and OAuth 2.0 in the new 5G mobile network standard [GP-
P18] shows that these technologies will be around for a while, even if new technologies
are certainly developed and current ones upgraded.
Another key aspect in development of new AAA technologies is their ability to scale.
As a link posted to Twitter can go around the world in minutes, the amount of users a
system serves can rise fairly quickly from a few to hundreds of thousands. The AAA
must not become a bottleneck in any environment and it must scale along other system
components. 
The streaming platform paradigm, presented in Chapter 7.2, enables future growth with
support for millions of simultaneous messages. Loose coupling in microservices gives
services freedom to be down without affecting the whole environment, also making it
possible to do rolling upgrades without any visible changes to users.
Newer technologies for modern AAA, presented in Chapter 6 and shown to be feasible
in Chapter 8, are already key parts of world's most used services and the adoption of
such new technologies will likely increase in the future. They also provide good build-
ing blocks for new authentication and authorisation frameworks as well as for commu-
nication models for internal and external communication of distributed systems.
The work around distributed AAA is nowhere finished and as systems and computers
evolve, so must both architectural patterns and algorithms used. One, perhaps a bit more
47
distant issue will be quantum computing. As computational power grows exponentially,
algorithms used to safeguard communication and authenticate users must be switched to
quantum-safe ones, preventing anyone from calculating the secrets used, for example, in
Diffie-Hellman, TLS connections or JSON Web Tokens.
In a more nearer future more work will be needed in service meshes. As we're moving
from securing internal networks by securing their outside connections, the zero trust net-
working paradigm [GiB17] is suggesting that even such networks should have their
communications completely secured. The SPIFFE framework, presented in Chapter
5.2.2, is a step in the right direction, but more work is needed, for example on initialisa-
tion of trust when a new device or user joins the network.
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Attachment: Ambassador AuthService
Functional components of the Ambassador OpenID Connect authentication service are
included in the subchapters. Tests, listed specific dependencies and documentation that
are vital parts of any software project, are not included as they are not needed for
running the code, but they can be found in the actual code repository [Myy18].
Chapter A.1 includes the main code of the program with routes for different functions
and a system health test. Chapter A.2 has the login functionality related to the OpenID
Connect Authorization Code Flow and JSON Web Token creation. Chapter A.3
includes the authorisation functionality used for validating incoming requests and
revoking JWTs of logged out sessions.
AuthService's version 1.0 was released in the beginning of October 2018. Within its
first month, its containerised version passed 10 000 downloads on Docker hub. While
some downloads are most likely from the same users, it is still safe to say that it has
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    port = os.Getenv("PORT")
    if len(port) == 0 {
        log.Println("No port specified, using 8080 as default.")
        port = "8080"
    }
}
func parseEnvURL(URLEnv string) *url.URL {
    envContent := os.Getenv(URLEnv)
    parsedURL, err := url.ParseRequestURI(envContent)
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    if err != nil {
        log.Fatal("Not a valid URL for env variable ", URLEnv, ": ", 
envContent, "\n")
    }
    return parsedURL
}
func parseEnvVar(envVar string) string {
    envContent := os.Getenv(envVar)
    if len(envContent) == 0 {
        log.Fatal("Env variable ", envVar, " missing, exiting.")
    }
    return envContent
}
func scheduleBlacklistUpdater(seconds int) {
    for {
        time.Sleep(time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second)
        go updateBlacklist()
    }
}
// HealthHandler responds to /healthz endpoint for application 
monitoring
func HealthHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
    w.Write([]byte("OK"))
}
func main() {
    wh := newWildcardHandler()
    router := mux.NewRouter()
    router.HandleFunc("/healthz", 
HealthHandler).Methods(http.MethodGet)
    router.HandleFunc("/login/oidc", 
OIDCHandler).Methods(http.MethodGet)
    router.HandleFunc("/login", LoginHandler).Methods(http.MethodGet)
    router.HandleFunc("/logout", 
LogoutHandler).Methods(http.MethodGet)
    router.PathPrefix("/").Handler(wh)
    updateBlacklist()
    go scheduleBlacklistUpdater(60)
    var listenPort = ":" + port
    log.Println("Starting web server at", listenPort)
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    // Because Host still has a port if it was in URL
    hostname = strings.Split(parseEnvURL("SELF_URL").Host, ":")[0] 
    clientID := parseEnvVar("CLIENT_ID")
    clientSecret := parseEnvVar("CLIENT_SECRET")
    ctx = context.Background()
    provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, 
parseEnvURL("OIDC_PROVIDER").String())
    if err != nil {
        log.Fatal("OIDC provider setup failed: ", err)
    }
    oidcConfig = &oidc.Config{
        ClientID: clientID,
    }
    var oidcScopes []string
    // "openid" (oidc.ScopeOpenID) is a required scope for OpenID 
Connect flows.
    oidcScopes = append(oidcScopes, oidc.ScopeOpenID)
    for _, elem := range strings.Split(parseEnvVar("OIDC_SCOPES"), " 
") {
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        oidcScopes = append(oidcScopes, elem)
    }
    var redirURL = parseEnvURL("SELF_URL").String()
    if string(redirURL[len(redirURL)-1]) == "/" {
        redirURL = string(redirURL[:len(redirURL)-1])
    }
    redirURL = redirURL + "/login/oidc"
    oauth2Config = oauth2.Config{
        ClientID:     clientID,
        ClientSecret: clientSecret,
        RedirectURL:  redirURL,
        // Discovery returns the OAuth2 endpoints.
        Endpoint: provider.Endpoint(),
        Scopes: oidcScopes,
    }
    oidcProvider = provider
    rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano())
    // 64 char(512 bit) key is needed for HS512
    hmacSecret = initialiseHMACSecretFromEnv("JWT_HMAC_SECRET", 64)
}
// OIDCHandler processes authn responses from OpenID Provider, 
exchanges token to userinfo and establishes user session with cookie 
containing JWT token
func OIDCHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    var authCode = r.FormValue("code")
    if len(authCode) == 0 {
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), "Missing url parameter: code")
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Missing url parameter:
code")
        return
    }
    var state = r.FormValue("state")
    if len(state) == 0 {
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), "Missing url parameter: state")
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Missing url parameter:
state")
        return
    }
    // Getting original destination from DB with state
    destination, err := redisdb.Get("state-" + state).Result()
    if err != nil {
        if err.Error() == "redis: nil" { // State didn't exist, 
redirecting to new login
            log.Print(getUserIP(r), " No state found with ", state, ",
starting new auth session.\n")
            beginOIDCLogin(w, r, "/")
            return
        }
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        returnStatus(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Error 
fetching state from DB.")
        panic(err)
    }
    oauth2Token, err := oauth2Config.Exchange(ctx, authCode)
    if err != nil {
        log.Println("Failed to exchange token:", err.Error())
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to 
exchange token.")
        return
    }
    rawIDToken, ok := oauth2Token.Extra("id_token").(string)
    if !ok {
        log.Println("No id_token field available.")
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "No id_token 
field in OAuth 2.0 token.")
        return
    }
    // Verifying received ID token
    verifier := oidcProvider.Verifier(oidcConfig)
    idToken, err := verifier.Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
    if err != nil {
        log.Println("Not able to verify ID token:", err.Error())
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Unable to 
verify ID token.")
        return
    }
    userInfo, err := oidcProvider.UserInfo(ctx, 
oauth2.StaticTokenSource(oauth2Token))
    if err != nil {
        log.Println("Problem fetching userinfo:", err.Error())
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Not able to 
fetch userinfo.")
        return
    }
    claims := json.RawMessage{}
    if err = userInfo.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
        log.Println("Problem getting userinfo claims:", err.Error())
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Not able to 
fetch userinfo claims.")
        return
    }
    cookie := createCookie(claims, idToken.Expiry, hostname)
    // Removing OIDC flow state from DB
    err = redisdb.Del("state-" + state).Err()
    if err != nil {
        log.Println("WARNING: Unable to remove state from DB,", 
err.Error())
    }
    log.Println(getUserIP(r), "Login validated with ID token, 
redirecting with cookie.")
    http.SetCookie(w, cookie)
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    http.Redirect(w, r, destination, http.StatusFound)
}
// beginOIDCLogin starts the login sequence by creating state and 
forwarding user to OIDC provider for verification
func beginOIDCLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, origURL 
string) {
    var state = createNonce(8)
    err := redisdb.Set("state-"+state, origURL, time.Hour).Err()
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    http.Redirect(w, r, oauth2Config.AuthCodeURL(state), 
http.StatusFound)
}
func createCookie(userinfo []byte, expiration time.Time, domain 
string) *http.Cookie {
    token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS512, jwt.MapClaims{
        "jti": uuid.New().String(),
        "iss": hostname,
        "iat": time.Now().Unix(),
        "exp": expiration.Unix(),
        "uif": base64encode(userinfo), // Userinfo will be readable to
user
    })
    tokenString, err := token.SignedString(hmacSecret)
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    cookie := &http.Cookie{
        Name:    "auth",
        Value:   tokenString,
        Path:    "/",
        Domain:  domain,
        Expires: expiration,
    }
    return cookie
}
func createNonce(length int) string {
    var nonce = make([]rune, length)
    for i := range nonce {
        nonce[i] = nonceChars[rand.Intn(len(nonceChars))]
    }
    return string(nonce)
}
func parseJWT(tokenstr string) (*jwt.Token, error) {
    token, err := jwt.Parse(tokenstr, func(token *jwt.Token) 
(interface{}, error) {
    if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unexpected signing method: %v", 
token.Header["alg"])
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        }
        return hmacSecret, nil
    })
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    if token.Valid {
        return token, nil
    }
    return nil, errors.New("Token not valid")
}
func initialiseHMACSecretFromEnv(secEnv string, reqLen int) []byte {
    envContent := os.Getenv(secEnv)
    if len(envContent) < reqLen {
        log.Println("WARNING: HMAC secret not provided or secret too 
short. Generating a random one from nonce characters.")
        return []byte(createNonce(reqLen))
    }





    "crypto/md5"
    "encoding/base64"
    "encoding/hex"
    "encoding/json"
    "log"
    "net/http"
    "os"
    "reflect"
    "strings"
    "time"
    jwt "github.com/dgrijalva/jwt-go"




var logoutCookie = false
var blacklist []string
type blacklistItem struct {
    Key        string    `json:"key"`
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    JWTHash    string    `json:"hash"`
    Expiration time.Time `json:"exp"`
}
func init() {
    redisAddr := parseEnvVar("REDIS_ADDRESS")
    redisPwd := parseEnvVar("REDIS_PASSWORD")
    redisdb = redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{
        Addr:     redisAddr,
        Password: redisPwd,
        DB:       0,
    })
    _, err := redisdb.Ping().Result()
    if err != nil {
        log.Fatal("Problem connecting to Redis: ", err.Error())
    }
    envContent := os.Getenv("LOGOUT_COOKIE")
    if envContent == "true" {
        logoutCookie = true
    }
}
// LoginHandler processes login requests
func LoginHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    beginOIDCLogin(w, r, "/")
}
// Wildcardhandler to provide ServeHTTP method required for Go's 
handlers
type wildcardHandler struct {
}
func (wh *wildcardHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r 
*http.Request) {
    AuthReqHandler(w, r)
}
func newWildcardHandler() *wildcardHandler {
    return &wildcardHandler{}
}
// AuthReqHandler processes all incoming requests by default, unless 
specific endpoint is mentioned
func AuthReqHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    cookie, err := r.Cookie("auth")
    if err != nil {
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Cookie not set, 
redirecting to login.")
        beginOIDCLogin(w, r, r.URL.Path)
        return
    }
    if len(cookie.Value) == 0 { // No auth header set
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Empty authorization
header.")
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Cookie empty or 
malformed.")
    } else {
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        token, err := parseJWT(cookie.Value)
        if err != nil {
            if err.Error() == "Token is expired" {
                w.Header().Set("X-Unauthorized-Reason", "Token 
Expired")
                log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "JWT token 
expired.")
            } else {
                log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Problem 
validating JWT:", err.Error())
            }
            returnStatus(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Malformed or 
expired token in cookie.")
            return
        }
        if checkBlacklist(hashString(token.Raw)) {
            log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Token in 
blacklist.")
            returnStatus(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Not logged in")
            return
        }
        uifClaim, err := base64decode(token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
["uif"].(string))
        if err != nil {
            log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Not able to 
decode base64 content:", err.Error())
            returnStatus(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Malformed 
cookie.")
            return
        }
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Accepted.")
        w.Header().Set("X-Auth-Userinfo", string(uifClaim[:]))
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusOK, "OK")
    }
}
// LogoutHandler blacklists user token
func LogoutHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    cookie, err := r.Cookie("auth")
    if err != nil {
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Cookie not set, not
able to logout.")
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Cookie not set.")
        return
    }
    token, err := parseJWT(cookie.Value)
    if err != nil {
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Not able to use 
JWT:", err.Error())
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Malformed JWT in 
cookie.")
        return
    }
    tokenHash := hashString(token.Raw)
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    if checkBlacklist(tokenHash) {
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Token already 
blacklisted, cannot to logout again.")
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Not logged in.")
        return
    }
    jwtExp := int64(token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)["exp"].(float64))
    _, err = addToBlacklist(tokenHash, time.Unix(jwtExp, 0))
    if err != nil {
        log.Println(getUserIP(r), "Problem setting JWT to Redis 
blacklist:", err.Error())
        returnStatus(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Problem 
logging out.")
        return
    }
    log.Println(getUserIP(r), r.URL.String(), "Logged out, token added
to blacklist.")
    if logoutCookie { // Sends empty expired cookie to remove the 
logged out one.
        var emptyClaims []byte
        newCookie := createCookie(emptyClaims, time.Now().AddDate(0, 
0, -2), hostname)
        http.SetCookie(w, newCookie)
    }
    returnStatus(w, http.StatusOK, "Succesfully logged out.")
}
func returnStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, statusCode int, errorMsg 
string) {
    w.WriteHeader(statusCode)
    w.Write([]byte(errorMsg))
}
func getUserIP(r *http.Request) string {
    headerIP := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
    if headerIP != "" {
        return headerIP
    }
    return strings.Split(r.RemoteAddr, ":")[0]
}
func hashString(str string) string {
    hasher := md5.New()
    hasher.Write([]byte(str))
    return hex.EncodeToString(hasher.Sum(nil))
}
func base64encode(data []byte) string {
    str := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(data)
    return str
}
func base64decode(str string) ([]byte, error) {
    arr, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(str)
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    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    return arr, nil
}
func addToBlacklist(tokenHash string, exp time.Time) (bool, error) {
    blKey := createNonce(8)
    blItem := &blacklistItem{Key: blKey, JWTHash: tokenHash, 
Expiration: exp}
    blJSON, err := json.Marshal(blItem)
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    err = redisdb.HSet("blacklist", blKey, string(blJSON)).Err()
    if err != nil {
        return false, err
    }
    blacklist = append(blacklist, tokenHash)
    return true, nil
}
func updateBlacklist() {
    res, err := redisdb.HVals("blacklist").Result()
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    var newBlacklist []string
    for _, i := range res {
        var blItem blacklistItem
        err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(i), &blItem)
        if err != nil {
            panic(err)
        }
        if blItem.Expiration.Before(time.Now()) {
            log.Println("Removing expired token", blItem.Key, "from 
blacklist.")
            err = redisdb.HDel("blacklist", blItem.Key).Err()
            if err != nil {
                panic(err)
            }
            continue
        }
        newBlacklist = append(newBlacklist, blItem.JWTHash)
    }
    if !reflect.DeepEqual(blacklist, newBlacklist) {
        blacklist = newBlacklist
        log.Println("Blacklist changes in Redis, local blacklist 
recreated.")
    }
}
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func checkBlacklist(jwtHash string) bool {
     for _, e := range blacklist {
         if jwtHash == e {
             return true
         }
     }
     return false
}
